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~ttpr.ctnt QJc-u:rt ltf tlt.c ~ttitcb- .:§fa:tc,s-
'Jill'ailfrington, tB. QJ. 20ffeJ.l.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
December 11, 1980 
Re: 79-6027 - wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis: 
In my judgment your memorandum sets forth an 
appropriate disposition of this somewhat unusual case. 
My only suggestion of substance is that I am not sure 
we should indulge in the speculation that this lawyer 
was motivated by the employer 's interest in having a 
test case on · this issue. It seems to me you have 
enough basis for questioning his fidelity to his client 
without that speculation and I think it is perhaps too 









~uprtnu <!Jamt itf tltt ~ttitth ~tlrlt,s-
Jf ag4ittgfon. ~. <!J. 2llffe~, 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
December 11, 1980 
Re: 79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis: 
In my judgment your memorandum sets forth an 
appropriate disposition of this somewhat unusual case. 
My only suggestion of substance is that I am not sure 
we should indulge in the speculation that this lawyer 
was motivated by the employer's interest in having a 
test case on this issue. It seems to me you have 
enough basis for questioning his fidelity to his client 
without that speculation and I think it is perhaps too 




Copies to the Conference 
I.' 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
,ju;rumt C!Jo:ttd of iqt Jm±tb .itatts-
Jktglrtttghtn. ~. QJ. 20ffe~~ 
December 11, 1980 
Re: 79-6027 - wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis, 
I shall probably write separately 
in this case; but even so, I may also 
join you. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 












JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.§u.vrtmt <!Jou.rt of t£rr 'Jnitr~ j,tautl 
'Ulaa-£rington. JO. QJ. 2llp)l.~ 
December 11, 1980 
Re: No. 79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis: 






JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
,jnpuuu (!tltltrl 4tf tfyt ~b .jhdts 
._-ulfitt:gfon. ~. (!t. 2.llffe)l.~ 
Re: No. 79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis: 
December 17, 1980 
I have given careful consideration to your memorandum. 
It seems to me that it proposes a proper way of disposing 
of a troublesome case and, at the same time, preserves the 
basic issue for review in the future in a better case. 
I therefore would join an opinion prepared on the basis 
of your memorandum. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
~nprttttt <!I'1ttri llf tlrt ~tb ,jtaftg 
-aslt"in!ltott. ~. <q. 2llffe)!' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
December 18, 1980 
Re: No. 79-6027 Wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis: 
In the event your opinion becomes the opinion of 
the Court, I will be happy to join it. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 
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Most of 4tlanta.'s Pornography Shops to Clos~ in a Pact 
. ' · , . • .... 1 • • • • •• -
With· Prosecutor\ 
-----'- . ,----------,----~ 
ATLANTA, Jan. 18 (AP)-Almost all 
of Atlanta's adult bookstores and movie 
theaters have agreed to clos~ in return 
for dismissal of charges against their em-
ployees. A prosecutor hailed the bargain 
as proof that "law enforcement now has 
the upper hand" against pornography. 
"If you need a dirty book, you'll have to 
leave Atlanta to get it," said Gler.n Zell, 
an attorney for the stores. · · 
Mr. Zell said the owners of at least 16 
adult bookstores had agreed Friday to 
close if the Fulton County Solicitor Gen-
eral, Hinson McAuliffe, would dismiss all 
charges against their employees. Leon-
an1 Rhodes, an assistant solicitor gen-
eral, said this would leave one adult book-
.. 
store, three adult theaters and one peel)-
show still operating in Atlanta. 
Employees at some of the bookstores 
and theater.s'began packing their belong-
ings as sales were being advertised at 
many of the concerns. "We're tired of 
fighting," said a worker at one of the 
bookstores. "We're getting out of here." 
Mr. Zell said bis clients had decided to 
leave Fulton County. He said "hassles 
with the police, fees for lawyers" and 
higher rents had made "the marginal 
profits for pornography . unbelievably 
low." ~- · · ·- · · · 
Under the agreement, the state will 
withhold prosecution for six months. If 







by then, Mr. McAuliffe will seek to dis- lowed authorities to build up recon1s 
miss about 40 cases against ~pl~ ,work- against the concerns as public nuisances, 
ing in the businesses. . _ and they then began arguing in court that 
· For the Solicitor General, the agree- they should be closed. . 
ment ended a long antipornography cam- Mr. McAu!:ffe also obtained court or-
paign, which had already reduced the ders clo~ing the lucrative "peep..show" 
number of bookstores and theaters from sections of the bookstores, and filed peti-
44 about four years ago. tions in United States District Court 
_At first, deputies cited employees of the against what he called the "paper corpo-
businesses for selEng pornography, per- rations" holding title to many of the 
suading the courts to impose steadily stores. 
higher fines, most of which were paid by "I llave always felt that the people of 
U·.e owners. Then the police began bring- ~ulton County wanted pornography ban-
ing charges against customers :Or such ished from the county, so I don't really 
offenses as solicitation, sodomy and inde- feel vindicated," Mr. McAuliffe said. 
cent exposure. · I "The critics never bothered me any-
Repeated prosecution_~~f customers al- way." -
--- ~ -
f p 











. •J • 
• . .l .··• ... 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In light of Byron's memorandum circulated today, I 
will make some changes in my memorandum that I hope will be 
responsive. 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prttttt C!fc-url cf tlf t ~tb ~tldts 
jira:s!pnghttt. ~. cq. 2Ilffe~~ 
January 6, 1981 
Re: No. 79-6027 Wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, ( 
1J'v' 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
'. 
,. 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
;§u.p:rmrt (!Jouri of tqt ~h ;§tatts 
~as£rnghtn. ~- OJ. 2.llffe>¼~ 
January 7, 1981 
RE: 79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis: 
/ 
I agree generally with your analysis and could join 
a disposition along the lines you propose. 
Mr. Justice Powell 





;iu:puuu Qio-url o-f tlrt ~nitt~ ;ihrlt,g 
..-zudrittgfon. J. QI. 2llffe)!, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 9, 1981 
Re: 79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis: 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~u,p~tnu (!Jom-t irf tqt ~nitth ~huts 
Jras4ittghm. !9. QJ. 2llffe.l!~ 
Re: No. 79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia 
Dear Lewis: 
This is a formal join in your opinion. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 










THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu.p:rtutt QJltllfi ltf tqt ~tt~ .§taftg 
~Mqinghttt. J. QJ. 2!1.;t'!.;l 
January 9, 1981 















To: Tha Chief J us t i ce 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Jus+ ice ~ t:e t 
Mr. ,Tu: .'rl~~ i all 
Ur. Juc ~ 0 1 la 1kmun 
~ , . Jt.G C.C.) L)U~ldl l 
,\r. Jl.~;~1ce R •hriquist 
Mr. Ju8t ; ca Stev0ns 
Fr om: Mr . ~ e White 
Circula.to:1: 14 JAN 198-l---
Recircu lJtJd : _____ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. 79~6027 
Raymond Wood et al., Petitioners, I On Writ of Certiorari to ~ M.A.-L,.f 
v. the Court of Appeals of - - \ 
State of Georgia. Georgia. 
[January -, 1981] h1~ 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. -----
The Court's disposition of this case is twice flawed: first, _J__ 
there is no jul'.isdiction to vacate the judgment on the federal W...e_ ~,-
constitutional ground upon which the Court rests; second, 
the record does not sustain the factual inferences required to  
support the Court's judgment. 
I 
The petition for certiorari presented a single federal ques-
tion: does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment permit a State to revoke an indigent's probation 
because he has failed to make regular payments toward the 
satisfaction of a line? This issue was pl'operly presented to 
and ruled upon by the Georgia courts. No other federal con-
stitutional issue was presented there or brought here. The 
Court, however, disposes of this case on another ground, but a 
ground that also involves a constitutional issue: the possibly 
divided loyalties of petitioners' counsel may have deprived 
petitioners of due process and their constitiutional right to 
counsel. Thus, we are to avoid one constitutional issue in 
favor of another, which was not raised by petitioners either 
here or below. I do not believe that this Court has jurisdic-
tion even to reach this question, nor do I see why we should 
prefer one constitution! issue to allother, even if we had the 
jurisdiction. 
The Court, ante, at n. 20, suggests that the conflict of in-
tetest issue was presented here by respondent, the State of 
'19-6027-DISSENT 
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Georgia. But the State merely argued that petitioners' at-
torney was also the attorney for petitioners' employer who had 
agreed to pay the fine and who was uow seeking to avoid 
payment by arguing petitioners' indigency. Neither here nor 
in the trial court has the State ever suggested that petitioner 
was deprived of due process or raised any other federal con-
stitutional issue. The State has surely not confessed error or 
given any other indication that it is seeking anything but an 
affirmance of the decision below-hardly an appropriate dis-
position if the State is suggesting that petitioners were denied 
their constitutional right to counsel. Moreover, nowhere in 
the passage of the response cited by the Court are the terms 
"conflict of interest" used, nor is there even a clear suggestion 
made that counsel was acting other than in the interests of 
petitioners in arguing that an indigent's probation cannot be 
revoked for failure to pay a fine. 
However the State's argument here is to be characterized, 
this case comes to us on writ of certiorari to a state court. 
Our jurisdiction, therefore, arises under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3) 
and is limited here to federal rights and privileges that have 
been "specially set up or claimed," and upon which there has 
been a final decision by the highest state court in which a 
decision could be had. The right to counsel claim was never 
raised in the state court, nor did the state court ever render 
a decision on the issue: There is, thus, a jurisdictional bar to 
our reaching the issue. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786, 799 
(1972); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971); Cardinale 
v. Louis'iana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969) , and cases cited there. 
It is as clear as could be that no federal constitutional claim 
of any kind was made in the state courts with respect to a 
conflict of interest and the adequacy of pet:tioners' counsel. 
At the revocation hearing, petitioners testified that they were 
without funds to pay the fines, and their counsel urged that 
to incarcerate them would violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. On cross-examination, peti~ 
79...(l027-DISSENT 
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tioners indicated that they had been assured by their employer 
that the employer would pay employee fines if they were 
convicted in cases such as this. The State's attorney then 
asserted several times that there was a conflict of interest 
because petitioners' counsel also represented petitioners' cor-
porate employer and was being paid by that concern to 
represent petitioners.1 But far from suggesting that the 
1 The following colloquy, similar to others, took place at one point in the 
revocation hearing: 
"MR. RHODES: Your Honor, I submit that actually what we have 
here is a conflict of interest on Mr. Zell's part. He's rcpre:;enting the com-
pany and he's trying to get out of paying this money that the,;e people 
expert that company to pay that money. Mr. Zell is here pnrportiug to 
represent her while he legally repre::;ents a compauy that ha,; promii;ecl to 
pay all these expenses and fines for the:;r people. And l would aHk the 
Court to look into that and make a determination of that, and if necei;.,;ary, 
see that tlicsc people have Counsel to enforce that agreement uetween 
that company and these people. 
"THE COURT: State font again now. 
"MR. RHODES: Mr. Zell is here representing Mrs. Allen. Now, Mrs. 
Allen C'ontends that that company promised to pay all this s::i that :;he 
wouldn't have to go through all of this. 
"Now they have not done it. 
"And I submit that Mr. Zell represents that rompany. That he is, hi;;i 
first allegiance is to that company, and not to Mrs. Allen. 
"And that thPre's a conflict of interest, and thal this ought to be lookrd 
into by this Court. 
"THE COURT: You wbh to respond? 
"MH. ZELL: I don't think it makes any S<'PSe what he's saying but 
I will if the C'ourt want:a; me to. I don't think I'm required to. 
"THE COURT: I don't know whether there':; anything the Court <'01tld 
look into. What speeifically do you w,mt the Court to look iuto? 
"MR. RHODES: Mr. Zell is here supposedly representing Mrs. Allen. 
He ut the same time represents tlw people who promised to take care of 
these things and lo pay these fines. 
"Now tho:;e people are not doing i1. And they apparently have reneged 
on it at this point. I think if you sent thet'e people out to the jail for a 
while I think they would pay it berause they don't want the other em-
ployee~ to ~now that they are not taking care of these things when they 
ff 6027-DISSENT 
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alleged conflict was a ground of relief for petitioners, the 
State suggested that petitioners and t.heir counsel had misled 
the court into thinking that the employer would pay the 
fines, and that the employer's undertaking should be enforced 
by sending petitioners "out to jail for a while." 2 rather than 
permit the employer to renege and free petitioners on equal 
protection grounds. This would convince the employer to 
pay because it would not want other employees to know that 
they would not be taken care of in the event trouble arose. 3 
In the course of these arguments, the State never mentioned 
the Federal Constitution. 
~ y in turn responded that although there 
had been an advance arrangement between petitioners and 
their employer that fines would be paid by the latter. the 
employer had not paid, and the only issue was whether peti-
tioners should go to jail when they were without funds them-
selves to pay the fines. He urged that jailing them would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.~ He als,o suggested that 
come up ." Tran C'ript of Revocation Hra.riug (Tr.) 14-15. The tran-
script is an appendix to the response of respondent. 
Other discussions appear at Tr. 25-27 and Tr. 27-28. 
2 Tr. 15. 
3 The State':-, position in this regard is clear from its response to the· 
petition for certiorari: 
"In fact, Respondent believes t.ha.t the Petitioners have no intention what-
soever in paying these finrs, as their testimony indicates that they are 
of the opinion tha,t their rmployers should have paid thc1,e .fines. The 
Petitioners are thus holding the enforcement of .fines as a recognized sen-
tencing tool a. hostage because of 1heir beliefl:i that others should pay 
their finel:i for them. By arguing at thi:; time that they are indigent they 
are miing this as a shield to hide behind their responsibility to pay a fine, 
which they earlier agreed to pay by virtue of Urnir silence which led the 
sentencing court to conclude that they were able to pay these fines."· 
Response of Respondent 10. 
Elsewhere, the State sugge:;ted "that they be put out there iu jail and 
start serving-that's the only way really 1 know to enforce the sentence· 
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if the asserted conflict of interest raised an ethical problem 
in the mind of the State's attorney, a complaint should be filed 
with the state bar.5 
~he judge, apparently rejecting the equal protection claim, 
revoked petitioners' probation, although petitioners have re-
mained free on bond pending appeal. The sole issue in the 
Georgia Court of Appeals was whether petitioners had been 
denied the equal protection of the laws. That claim was 
reJected, the judgment of revocation was affirmed and the 
Georgia Supreme Court denied further review. The equal 
protection issue, as I have said, is the only federal constitu-
tional issue that has been presented here. 
The Court apparently believes that under Cuyler v. S-ulli- i 
van the possibility of a conflict of interest of constitutional 
dimensions should have prompted further inquiry by the trial 
judge. But Cuyler v. Sullivan did not purport to give this 
Court jurisdiction over a claim otherwise beyond its reach. 
Cuyler held only that if a trial court "reasonably should know 
that a particu ar conflict exists, en a a1 ure to initia~ an 
inqmry may constitu ea ,.ixth Amendment viol t·on. If this 
is tl-ie case ere, t en petitioners remain free to seek collateral 
relief in the lower courts.0 
A majority of the Court, however, proceeds on the basis 
that it has jurisdiction to address the due process-adequacy 
of counsel issue. Accordingly, I proceed on that assumption. 
u 
As I see it, the Court's disposition of the case rests upo11 
critical factual assumptions that al'e not supported by the - ~ 
1 Tr. 27: "I would suggest Mr. Rhodt>S report this to the Stale Bar of 
Georgia and be glad at a heariug to testify if there is any impropriety and 
submit to any questions before the ~tate Bar." 
6 Rule 34, the plain error mle, gives us no authority to set. aside a state 
court judgment by qealing with a rom,-titutional issue neither rai:;cd nor 
decided in the state courts. Where an issue has been properly raised and 
decided in state litigation but not raised here, Rule 34 would permit us 
to reach that issue though not pr~ented by the parties here. 
ij 
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record. Certainly the mere fact that petitioners' counsel wa15 
paid by their employer does not in itself constitute a conflict 
of interest of constitutional dimension.7 Indeed, one would 
expect that in the normal course of things the interests of 
petitioners and of their empfoyer woufcl have corres >onded 
thr_o~ ~ pr~e_!a~s. t wou d have been just as much 
in the employer's as m the employees' interest to have had 
the employees adjudged innocent. Similarly, assuming that 
the employer had promised to pay whatever fines might be 
levie<l against the employees, it was in the employer's iutcrest, 
just as it was in their interest, to have these fines set at the 
lowest possib1e amount. · The conflict of interests , therefore, 
t')nly emerges by assuming that the employer. the owner of an 
adult bookstore and a movie theater, set out to construct a 
eonstitutional test case and the petitioners' counsel repre-
eented the employer in this regard. ~ot even a decision to 
pursue a test ca.se, however, would in itself create a conflict 
of interest. One must assume further that it was for the 
1ake of this interest that the employer decided not to pay 
ihe fines and for the sake of this interest of the employer 
that petitioners' attorney did not object to the siz:e of the 
Ines or move in time1y fashion for a modification of the con~ 
ditions of probation. 
I recogniz·e that the Court's conclusion relies oul upon the 
"possibility" of this scenario, but I nd these assumptions ___, 
implausible and would requite a much stronger showing than 
this record reveals before I would speculate on the likelihood 
of such a motive of the employer and the knowing cooperation 
of counsel to this end, let alone dispose of the case on that 
basis.8 First, since the only submission of petitioners was 
1 Although petitioner:; ' counsel admitted at oral nrgument that he hnd 
been paid by petitioncr<i ' employer at the time of trial, he indicated that 
the payment:;; from the employer ended al lite time petit iouers were put 
on probation . Tr. 13-16. 
& fethioners' attorney abo said that "I want the court to know, .am:I 
N--6027-DISSENT 
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that they should not go to jail for failure to pay their fines, 
even if the court sustained their position, their liability on 
the fine would remain-as would that of the employer if it had 
an enforceable obligation to pay. It is, therefore, difficult to 
find any interest that the employer might have in litigating 
a test case on this issue through the Georgia courts and to this 
Court. Second, the record suggests two much more plausible 
explanations of the employer's failure to pay the fines, neither 
of which implies a conflict of interest: The employer may 
have reneged on its promise to pay fines because petitioners 
were no longer working for the employer, or it may have 
reneged because ownership of the establishments changed 
hands.0 The fact that the employer may have continued to 
meet some of the expenses, but did not pay the substantial 
fines, does not indicate to me that the employer manipulated 
the situation to create a test case; more likely, the employer 
reneged on his promise because, given the change in circum-
stances of both the employer anathe petitioners, the expense 
was simply greater than that which the employer was willing 
to bear at tlus poin . 
Mr. Rhodes to know that I've attempted at least was asked, to get the 
fines paid. And of course, you can see the result of it. 
I told the three defendants I would represent them to the best of my 
ability, and I've explained this to the defendants, and I would like to make 
an explanation to the court ." Tr. p. 68. 
Interesting also is tbe following exhange from the cross-examination 
ef one of the petitioners: 
"Q Did you select Mr. Zell as your attorney? 
"A Yes, sir. I've 1rnown him a long time and I trust him. And he's 
the only lawyer I've ever had to have in my life, and yes, sir, I selected 
him." 
As far as this record reveals, none of the petitioners to this date has com-
plained about the legal representation. 
~ r 9 There iB" no indication in the record that the employer owned other 
"adult" e8tablishments. If, ru:, counsel suggested at oral argument, owner-
ship has in fact changed hands, then it seems unlikely tht.t,t the ex-<.'mployer 
. ,J would continue to be interested in creating and litigating a test case in a A4 ~ '" matter wifb which he is no longer coucerneq. 
8 
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If the employer was simply unwilling to pay the fines, then. 
the arguments advanced by the attorney may very well have 
been the best and only arguments available to petitioners. 10 
Indeed, the employer having failed to pay, counsel would have 
been derelict not to press the equal protection claim on behalf 
of his indigent clients. Obviously, success on this ground 
would have advantaged petitioners; and I fail to see. as 
apparently the trial court failed to see, Tr. 15, 28, how peti-
tioners will be constitutionally deprived by assertioll of the 
equal protection claim, The fact that petitioners did move, 
although belatedly, for a modification of the conditions of 
parole 11 further indicates that the employer was more iu-
terested in cutting his costs than creating a test case.12 On 
this record, therefore, I believe it necessary to reach the sub-
stantive question that we granted certiorari to resolve. 
III 
Although I think that there are circumstances in which a 
State may impose a suitable jail term in lieu of a fine wheµ 
the deferidant cannot or will not pay the fine, there are con-
10 Note that petitioners argue in fheir response that the trial court was 
fully aware of their financial situation. Response for Petitioners, at 2. 
This is amply supported by the record. Petitioners' attoruey conceded 
that a defendant w'ho has been fined and w110 himself could pay the fine 
could not hide behind the vromi::Je of another that t1ie latter -would pay. 
The point was, however, that these petitioners were indigent and could uot 
themselves pay. Tr. 69. 
11 The fact that this motion was ma.de and rejected suggests that ~ 
remand to the tria1 court to reconsider th'is issue is not IJ°ke1y to lead to 
a different result. 
12 Even this b'tatement asserts ·more than t11e evidence of record sup-
ports: other than t11e asse-rt'ions of t'he 'State's attorney in a colloquy with 
1he judge at lhe -revocation -hearing, there is no suggestion in t'his record 
that the employer directed this litigation in any wa.y. The fact that coun-
sel was paid for some period by the employer, does not support an in-
ference that coun,;cl was repre ·enting the interest:, of the employer rather 
than tbose of 1>ctitioncrs. See ABA Model Code of Professional R e:,pon~ 
.eibillty, D, R 5-107 (B). 
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stitutional limits on those circumstances, and the State of 
Georgia has exceeded the limits in this case. 
In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) , Williams, con-
victed of petty theft, received the maximum sentence of one-
year's imprisonment and a $500 fine (plus $5 in court costs). 
As permitted by Illinois statute, the judgment provided that 
if, when the one-year sentence expired, Williams did not im-
mediately pay the fine and court costs, he was to remain in 
jail a length of time sufficient to satisfy the total debt, cal-
culated at the rate of $5 per day. We held that "the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any sub-
stantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of 
their economic status." 399 U. S. , at 244. Therefore, the 
Illinois statute as applied to Williams, who was too poor to 
pay the fine , violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), involved an indigent 
defendant incarcerated for nonpayment of fines imposed for 
violating traffic ordinances. Under Texas law, traffic offenses 
were punishable only by fines, not imprisonment. When Tate · 
could not pay $425 in fines imposed for nine traffic convictions, 
he was jailed pursuant to the provisions of another Texas 
statute and a municipal ordinance that required him to re-
main in jail a sufficient time to satisfy the fines, again cal-
culated at the rate of $5 per day. We reversed on the au-
thority of Williams v. Illinois, saying: "Since Texas has legis-
lated a fines only policy for traffic offenses, that statutory · 
ceiling cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, 
limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to · 
pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent 
defendant without the means to pay his fine." 401 U. S. , at 
399. The Court, however, was careful to repeat what it had · 
said in Williams : " [T]he state is not powerless to enforce 
judgments against those financially unable to pay a fine" · 
&,ncl is.Jr~e to choose other means to effectuate this end. Ibid .. 
10 
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In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S., at 243, the Court empha .. 
sized that its holding "does not deal with a judgment of 
confinement for non-payment of a fi!}e in the familiar pattern 
of alternative sentence of $30 or 30 days." In neither Wil-
liams nor Tate did it appear that "jail [ was] a -rational and 
necessary trade-off to punish the individual who possesses no 
accumulated assets-since the substitute sentence provision, 
phrased in terms of a judgment co1lection statute, [did] not 
impose a discretionary jail term as an alternative s0ntence, 
but rather cquate[d] days in jail with a fixed sum." Wil-
liams v. Illinois, supra, 399 U. S., at 265 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in the result). As ·both the Court and justice Harlan 
implied, if the Court had confronted a legislative scheme that 
imposed alternative sentences, the ana1ysis would have· been 
different. 
Indigency does not insulate those who have violated the 
criminal law from any punishment ,vhatsoevcr. As I see it, 
if an indigent cannot pay a fine, even in installments. the 
Equal Protection Clause does not bar the State from specifying 
other punishment. even a. jail term, in lieu of the fine. 13 · To 
comply with the Equal Protection Clause, however, the State 
must make clear that the specified jail term in such circum-
stances is essentially a substitute for the fine and serves the 
same purpose of enforcing the particular statute that the 
defendant violated. In both Williams and Tate the State vio-
lated this principle by speaking inconsistently: "In each case, 
· the legislature drclarea its interest in penalizing a particular 
offense to be satisfi.e'd by a specified ja1l term (in ·rate, no jail 
13 In imposing an alternative srntence the state focuses on the penalty 
appropriate for the particular offense and structures two punishments, 
rach tailored to meet the State's ends in responding to the offense com-
mittrd. Such tailoring may consider the financial situation of the ·de-
fend:rnt , Williams v. New York , supra, 337 U. S, at 246-250, but it does 
so only in the context of structuring a penalty appropriate to the offense 
committ ed. 
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term at all) and at the same time subjected the indigent 
offender to a greater term of punishment. 
The incarceration of the petitioners in this case cannot be 
distinguished from that which we found to be unconstitutional 
in Williams and Tate. Here, the State imposed probated 
prison terms and fines, but made insta11ment payment of the 
fines a condition of probation: Had the fines been paid in full 
and other conditions of probation satisfied, there would have 
been no time in jail at all. Thus, the ends of the State's 
criminal justice system did not call for any loss of liberty 
except that incident to probation. 
Under these circumstances, the State's only interest in in-
carcerating these petitioners for not paying their fines was to 
impose a loss of liberty that would be as efficacious as the 
fines in satisfying the State's interests in enforcing the crimi-
nal law involved. However, no calculation like that was 
made here. Upon nonpayment, probation was automatically 
revoked and petitioners were sentenced to their full prison 
terms.14 There was no attempt to provide, in addition to the 
jail terms for which they were given probation, a term of 
imprisonment that would be a proper substitute for the fines. 
In fact, even at the conclusion of their prison terms, petitioners 
will apparently be liable for the unpaid fines. This is little 
more than imprisonment for failure to pay a fine, without 
regard to the goals of the criminal justice system. As in 
Will-iams and Tate, the State is speaking inconsistently con-
cerning the necessity of imprisonment to meet its penal ob-
jectives; imprisonment of an indigent under these circum-
stances is constitutionally impermissible. 
This case falls well within the limits of what we meant to 
prohibit when we announced in Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 
11 As the majority opinion makes clear, the fines were quite heavy, per-
haps in anticipation of payment by the employer. There was no expecta-
tion that these defendant:;, if they performed well on probation, W<1lllld 
:<ierve any time in jail, let alone a long tenra. 
12 
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(1971), that the "Constitution prohibits the State from im-
posing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting 
it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent/ 1 
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment, 
